Honourable
Dame Silvia Cartwright PCNZM,DBE,Governor-General of New Zealand
Private Bag
Wellington
New Zealand
Re:
(a) Complaint to Governor-General, Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces.
(b) High Court Appeal, Privacy Review Tribunal Decision \ HRRT 29/01
request by appellant for release of transcript.
(c) Please assist your Honour.
Dear
Commander-in-Chief Hon Dame Cartwright,
- The writer/plaintiff is deeply
concerned that he is been deprived of a right to have his recorded
complaints pertaining to aspects of his service with the New Zealand Army
heard. That the Chairperson hearing the complainants complaint before
Privacy Review Tribunal 13th June 2002 and 1st July
2002 has found the Tribunal does not have the powers to make a decision on
the substance of my complaint.
Because the plaintiff over a number of years complained to Chief of Staff
Defence Force who in turn has repeatedly refused to hear his complaints.
The plaintiff asked at hearing on the 13th June, that the
Tribunal Chairperson accept his moral and legal obligation to hear the
plaintiff’s complaints by virtue of a section set out within the Armed
Forces Discipline Act. A section that states a soldier must continue his
complaint to a higher authority until addressed.
It appears within the decision received today, that the Privacy Review
Tribunal appointed by your Honour, refuses to finalize my complaint.
Respectfully please would your Honour the Commander-in-Chief of the New
Zealand Armed Forces, please listen to my complaint?
Would your
Honour please take the time and if necessary receive pleadings in respect to
aspects of the way I was treated by army during my time past and present, in
service?
- The plaintiff is very unhappy
with findings of the Privacy Review Tribunal found within the decision
received today. It would appear to the plaintiff that either the Privacy
Commissioner or the plaintiff could likely file an appeal in the High
Court appealing other aspects relating to the privacy of an individual in
the Tribunals decision. At first glance, the plaintiff feels the Tribunals
finding in respect to sec. 66, at the very least, probably warrants a
hearing before the High Court however it seems somewhat unrelated to the
substance of the facts of the matters filed.
While clearly, the plaintiff has been deprived of proper legal
representation throughout the 14 years that it’s taken him to gain a
judicial hearing; he should of course not be deprived of a proper hearing.
The plaintiff is very concerned he does not have a copy of the transcript
of the hearings 13th June and 1st July to assist the
construction of an appeal before the High Court. He understands you
Honour, you alone have the power to order that he be provided with a copy
of the transcript of all the proceedings heard in these matters. Could you
please order that the plaintiff be given a copy of the Tribunal
Transcript?
The plaintiff is very concerned that his document in chief (Identifying
Doc.) was not given a reading at all during the Tribunal proceedings. That
the plaintiff (as stated by the chairperson because of a lack of
available tribunal time, time actually shortened by request from crown law)
was only allowed to explain some aspects of the filed attachments attached
to the Identifying Doc, a document earlier Chairperson Bathgate had
ordered he file as his document in chief.
The Tribunal may well have erred in its finding (44 of the decision) where
it is stated Ms Laracy (Crown Law) attended the meeting at Rotorua,
September 2001. The plaintiff states that a martial witness Crown
Solicitor “Mary-Jane Thomas” was removed from proceedings by crown law
after the meeting, and that she had witnessed Lt Col Taylor produce a
document bearing a clear forgery of his signature. That Ms Laracy did not
attend the meeting at Rotorua at all. That Barrister Peter Birks of
Rotorua was also present at that meeting. That the NZ RSA had paid for Mr
Birks attendance, however as the plaintiff is without funds to engage Mr
Birks he is therefore unable to be represented by him.
That the decision fails to acknowledge that the plaintiff suffered the
many problems suffered in direct consequence of the NZ Defence Force and
Government failure to hear his complaints, particularly I refer to the
plaintiff being in constant Psychological care with Mark Creswell Services
during the years he resided in Hervey Bay Queensland. That the Australian
RSL in Hervey Bay paid for, extensive psychological support, assisting the
plaintiff to address these matters. Matters pertaining to the Defence
Force repeated refusals, being refusals to produce documents now clearly
recorded however but for one not produced for hearing at the Tribunal.
The only documents (save other than the vaccination certificates and a
couple of tampered with signals) produced by Defence Force, were only
finally produced during the week preceding the hearing at Wellington on 13th
June. During the hearing, Lt Col Taylor quite clearly stated some of those
documents appeared repeatedly on the Defence Force file and he inferred I
was asking for documents I already had. I did not hold copies of those
documents and had not seen them before the meeting at Rotorua.
Chairperson Hindle stated in relation to those documents produced at
Rotorua by Lt Col Taylor, that it was the duty of the Plaintiff to call
witnesses. When however, Chairperson Hindle had ordered the defendant to
produce all the documents produced at Rotorua and therefore at the very
least in the plaintiffs mind, the duty lay with the Tribunal to summons
those witnesses Peter Birks and May-Jane Thomas. That the Humans Rights
Act quite clearly states a complainant cannot be adversely effected by
technicalities in Law.
Lt Col Taylor stated in evidence at the hearing in Auckland that the
plaintiff’s pay-book currently held by army, showed entries ceased in
February 1966. He still holds the plaintiff’s pay-book and vaccination
records even thought the plaintiff asked before the tribunal for his
documents to be given back to him.
During the latter part of the hearing Auckland 1st July,
Chairperson Hindle repeatedly inferred the plaintiff might have been
confused at the time of his second posting to Vietnam. The plaintiff
affirms before your Honour herein, that the only time he reengaged during
his army service was in February / March 1966 during his in transit
posting at Papakura military camp for service as a gunner driver with 161
Bty. The plaintiff did not sign the two reengagements recorded in his name
on file, nor had he ever seen them till some time during the early
1990’s, nor did he seek early release from his service contact, nor
either did he again reengage June 1967 during his service in South
Vietnam, as is incorrectly recorded on file. The defendant gave evidence
that the plaintiff had been posted to 161 Bty early 1966.
The plaintiff believes transcript of the proceeding at Wellington and
Auckland will clearly show Lt Col Taylor gave considerable and substantial
verbal evidence in reply in excess of Defence Forces written evidence in
chief.
Evidence in support of the plaintiffs claim that the army arranged a
sweetheart for the plaintiff to write to while in Vietnam, (even though
the plaintiff could not easily write as he could not spell) was
produced by the plaintiff in evidence and is not highlighted or mentioned
within the decision. The tribunal did not hear his evidence in Chief.
The plaintiff states army personal, mainly HQ staff Saigon South Vietnam,
assisted the arrangement of a marriage between the plaintiff and the young
lady. They assisted a marriage for twenty-three days after his return from
his active service. Active service mostly alone unarmed for thirteen
months in South Vietnam with very little support or even basic training.
The plaintiff was not really in a very fit state of mind then, he had been
escorted out of Vietnam, and kept drunk in Singapore for two weeks at
armies expensive before flown back to NZ.
- Your Honour a Col Seymour for
Chief of Defence Force clearly stated in writing the plaintiff’s correct
departure date; the correct day I departed overseas to defend New Zealand,
while the Tribunals decision appears to make small of the significance of
the senor offices statement. The decision appears to propose a person
other than Col Seymour wrote what he Col Seymour had signed, a completely
unsupported load of bunkum apparently supported by the tribunal.
Your Honour army forged not only my signature on reengagement contracts
held on file, but also rewrote my service records from the beginning of
1966 on, right through to the alleged discharge in mid 1968. The plaintiff
believes that was not lawful, that doing that did not constitute that that
is lawful for the constitution of his entitlement of a lawful discharge.
At the very least, the plaintiff’s pay-book proposes he never received
any army pay from February 1966 onwards. That the plaintiff’s
vaccination records quite clearly contain errors. That his annual medicals
are inconsistent with the Combat Brigade Groups high standard of unit
status reporting in place at that time. Eighteen months between his annual
medical at that time did not and could not have occurred.
That Lt Col Taylor cannot recall a document he produced is inconsistent
with what the plaintiff says occurred at the meeting at Rotorua.
Been taken off strength and put back on strength as records propose to
show occurred in June 1967, was not just some meaningless administration
process, proposed at hearing by Lt Col Taylor. The plaintiff
believes that was indeed consistent with the extension of the earlier
reengagement he had signed covering a tour of duty plus three months, as a
gunner driver with 161 Bty in South Vietnam, signed in February \ March
1966. It is consistent with the normal procedures the army employ on
reengagement. The only extension of his initial service contract the
plaintiff ever signed occurred in February \ March 1966.
The plaintiff was asked to return to New Zealand to sort these matters; he
is now left considerably out of pocket in doing so. The plaintiff has lost
more than thirty years of his life trying to come to terms with and
identifying why. Moreover, is doing his very best to bring the truth to
the front. Please don’t allow continued errors to go unchecked.
The New Zealand Government unlawfully attacked the plaintiff in Australia,
the events were preceded by errors in law here in New Zealand and relates
directly to the marriage the army arranged. In consequence, the plaintiff
lost family and farming interests in Australia. The plaintiff raised at hearing on a number of occasions
before the Privacy Review Tribunal, both in writing and verbally
expressing that his Human Rights are being seriously violated, violated
before law in New Zealand and as well in Australia, he cannot see any
evidence that the Humans Rights Commissioner chairing the Tribunal has
acted to sort that.
Respectfully please your Honour assists the plaintiff.
Yours truly
Robert F
Plumtree
40792